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Applying the maximum likelihood method of co-integration, this paper examines the 
impact of agricultural policy reforms on spatial integration of food grain markets in India. 
The extent of spatial integration of food grain markets has improved during the post-reform 
period, as the regional markets, which were either segmented or poorly integrated during the 
pre-reform period, are found to be strongly integrated, and in most cases to such an extent 
that satisfies the relative version of the law of one price. The agricultural policy reforms 
undertaken by the Indian government seem to have contributed towards improving the extent 
of spatial integration of food grain markets. The results offer important policy implications. 
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1.  INTRODUCTION 
 
The Indian government has been implementing comprehensive economic reforms 
involving structural adjustment and liberalisation programmes since 1991. An important 
component of such programmes is the liberalisation of agricultural commodity markets. 
Economic liberalisation since the early-1990s led to increasing withdrawal of 
government intervention from the agricultural commodity sector, which made 
agricultural prices dependent on the market forces. Jha and Srinivasan (2000) have 
argued that such liberalisation is required for achieving allocative efficiency and 
long-term growth in agriculture. Moreover, minimising government interventions in 
internal and external trade in agricultural commodities and maintaining its role of price 
stabilisation can yield positive welfare benefits. Government interventions are likely to 
distort price signals in spatially separated markets because of which agricultural prices 
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may not converge efficiently, and regional markets may remain segmented. Such 
interventions may insulate regional markets from each other and act as barriers to spatial 
market integration. Liberalisation of agricultural commodity markets is likely to 
strengthen spatial market integration by removing barriers to movement of commodities 
across markets, and allowing price signals and information to be transmitted smoothly 
and the market forces to determine agricultural prices.   
If agricultural markets are spatially integrated, producers and consumers will realise 
the gains from liberalisation. As the correct price signals are transmitted through the 
marketing channels, farmers will be able to specialise according to long-term 
comparative advantage and the gains from trade will be realised. Moreover, since 
integration of markets implies that a deficit or surplus in one market will be transmitted 
to other markets, an improvement in spatial integration of food markets will ensure 
regional balance among food-deficit, food-surplus and non-food cash crop-producing 
regions. Since spatial market integration refers to a situation in which the prices of a 
commodity in spatially separated markets move together and price signals and 
information are transmitted smoothly, spatial market integration may be evaluated in 
terms of a relationship between the prices of spatially separated markets. Since regional 
level trade flows data on agricultural commodities are not usually available, but the 
prices of traded agricultural commodities are readily available and generally considered 
as the most reliable information on marketing system in developing economies, market 
integration studies have been restricted to the interdependence of prices of spatially 
separated markets.   
The importance of liberalisation for agricultural commodity markets and recent 
advances in time series econometrics (viz., unit root and co-integration) have generated 
a lot of interest among researchers in investigating the spatial integration of agricultural 
commodity markets in many countries (see, for example, Alexander and Wyeth, 1994; 
Asche et al., 1999; Awokuse and Bernard, 2007; Baulch, 1997; Dahlgram and Blank, 
1992; Dercon, 1995; Fackler and Tastan, 2008; Faminow and Benson, 1990; Goletti et 
al., 1995; Goodwin and Schroeder, 1991; Ismet et al., 1998; Ravallion, 1986; Zanias, 
1999).  
A few researchers (for example, Dercon, 1995; Ismet et al., 1998) have tried to relate 
market integration to liberalisation. Dercon (1995) has argued that since the extent of 
spatial market integration determines the transmission speed of price changes due to any 
policy reforms across regional markets, the effects of liberalisation and other structural 
changes in markets should be evaluated not only on the basis of what happens to the 
prices for producers and consumers but also on the basis of functioning of markets. He 
has reported that liberalisation had positive effect on the functioning of Ethiopian grain 
markets through increased short-run integration. Evaluating the performance of 
Indonesian rice markets, Ismet et al. (1998) have argued for limiting government 
interventions in the integrated markets by rationalising its price stabilisation activities 
and buffer stock policies, and letting the private sector contribute as much as possible. 
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markets in India, using advanced time-series methods (see, for example, Ghosh, 2000, 
2003, 2008; Jha et al., 1997, 2005; Palaskas and Harriss-White, 1993). Very little work 
has, however, been done to examine the impact of agricultural policy reforms 
undertaken by the Indian government since the early-1990s on the performance of 
agricultural commodity markets. However, the importance of such a study can hardly be 
over emphasised because of its obvious policy implications. The success of agricultural 
policy reforms in improving spatial efficiency of agricultural commodity markets may 
be evaluated in terms of their impact on spatial market integration. 
This paper evaluates the spatial integration of food grain markets in India during the 
pre-and post-reform periods. Using the maximum likelihood (ML) method of 
co-integration due to Johansen (1988) and Johansen and Juselius (1990), it examines 
whether the agricultural policy reforms since the early-1990s have contributed towards 
improving spatial integration of food grain markets. Since rice and wheat are the major 
food crops, and regional level data on monthly prices of these crops are available 
consistently for a long period, we have confined our analysis to these crops only. After a 
brief review of agricultural policies, the paper analyses the empirical results obtained 
from applying the co-integration method, and draws policy conclusions.   
 
 
2.  AGRICULTURAL  POLICY  REFORMS 
 
Traditionally, Indian agricultural development was based on government 
interventions in the form of various restrictions on internal and external trade in 
agricultural commodities. The policies were primarily intended to promote agricultural 
growth, attain long-term food security and stabilise prices of agricultural commodities. 
Agricultural price policy was considered a part of the package of policies designed to 
promote investment and growth in agriculture. Price incentives in the form of support 
and procurement prices for some crops are offered to farmers to achieve the objectives. 
Government regulations on internal and external trade in agricultural commodities 
include licensing requirements and stocking limits for wholesale and retail trade, 
restrictions on storage, pricing and movement of agricultural commodities across regions, 
canalisation of trade in agricultural commodities through state trading agencies, 
quantitative restrictions (QRs) on foreign trade, and high tariffs on imports of 
agricultural commodities,. The Essential Commodities Act 1955 is the most pervasive 
Act containing most of the restrictions.   
However, these restrictions, by repressing private trading, did not promote 
competition for fair play of the market forces. The World Bank (1999) has reported that 
the government’s procurement, distribution, and buffer stock programmes have had 
negative impact of repressing private trading in food grains and undermining its 
potential contribution to long-term food security. Parikh et al. (2003) have argued that 
these interventions have produced adverse effects on gross domestic product and 
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adjustment and liberalisation programmes in agriculture in general and food grains in 
particular as the Indian government has been implementing in trade, industry and 
finance since 1991. The World Bank (1999) has proposed that the government should 
intervene in food grain market only when price fluctuations are outside the desired 
price-band. It should facilitate smooth operations of the market and should not exercise 
unnecessary control over it.   
The large-scale economic reforms initiated in 1991 have significant implications for 
agriculture, even though initially the reform process was not much explicit for this sector. 
The reform process in agriculture was initiated from 1994-95 when India became a part 
of the multilateral trading system under the World Trade Organisation (WTO). The 
agricultural policy reforms undertaken by the Indian government since the early-1990s 
are classified into two categories: (i) reform measures liberalising internal market for 
agricultural commodities, and (ii) policy reforms liberalising external trade in 
agricultural commodities. For a review of the internal and external trade policies and 
agricultural sector reforms, see Athukorala (2005), Bathla (2006) and Chadha et al. 
(2008). 
A series of domestic market reforms have been introduced to improve the efficiency 
of marketing system and to attract private investment and participation. The Agricultural 
Produce Marketing Regulations (APMR) Act has been amended. Most of the states have 
enacted state level APMR Acts. A network of regulated markets has been created to 
promote organised marketing of agricultural commodities. Changes have been made in 
the Essential Commodities Act 1955, which regulated internal trade in agricultural 
commodities. Restrictions on inter-regional movement of farm produce have been 
relaxed. Licensing requirements and stocking limits for wholesale and retail trade, and 
selective credit controls used to regulate institutional credit to traders are abolished. 
State trading activities have been significantly curtailed. Measures have been taken to 
simplify the regulatory nature of agricultural markets and to allow private sector to 
contribute as much as possible. Corporate sector has been permitted to enter the 
agricultural markets through ‘contract farming’, and many domestic and multinational 
firms are allowed to participate in the marketing and processing of agricultural products. 
Forward trading has been permitted in many agricultural commodities. 
External trade in agricultural commodities has been liberalised in line with the 
provisions of WTO. During the 1990s, trade policy reforms were undertaken to facilitate 
greater integration of the agricultural sector with global market. Since 1997, all Indian 
product lines have been placed under the Generalised System of Preference (GSP). All 
agricultural products were removed from quantitative restrictions (QRs) and brought 
under tariff system. The number of agricultural commodities earlier canalised through 
state trading agencies was reduced, and most of the commodities were brought under 
Open General Licensing (OGL). Average tariffs on agricultural imports were reduced 
considerably. Export policies were liberalised to promote export of agricultural 
commodities through relaxation in export quotas, removal of restrictions on licensing, 
minimum export price and increased availability of credit.   AGRICULTURAL POLICY REFORMS AND SPATIAL INTEGRATION  19
These policy reforms and the consequent changes in the marketing system are 
expected to improve the performance of agricultural commodity markets. The reforms in 
internal and external trade would promote private investment and participation, and 
improve spatial efficiency of the marketing system. The linkages among regional 
agricultural markets are likely to be strengthened, and the degree of spatial market 
integration would improve during the post-reform period.   
Since tradability signals the transfer of information regarding market conditions (viz., 
excess demand or supply) from one market to another as actual or potential trade flows, 
market integration is usually described in terms of tradability between markets. Spatial 
market integration, essentially based on trade flows, therefore, includes the market 
clearance process in which demand, supply and transaction costs in different markets 
jointly determine the prices, trade flows and the transmission of price shocks from one 
market to another. Hence, market integration could be viewed as a situation where price 
signals and information are transmitted to different markets so that the prices in spatially 
separated markets move together over time. Naturally, any policy that improves the 
process of trade flows would strengthen spatial integration of markets. Government 
policies liberalising internal and external trade in agricultural commodities would make 
trade flows smoother, and allow the market forces to play a greater role in price 
determination. This would improve the mechanism through which price signals and 
information are transmitted smoothly across spatially separated markets. 
 
 
3.  METHODOLOGY 
 
Two markets are considered to be spatially integrated if, in the presence of trade 
between them, the price in importing market ( it P ) is equal to the price in exporting 
market ( jt P ) plus the transport and other transfer costs involved in moving goods 
between them ( t T ). This happens because of the spatial arbitrage condition given by 
t jt it T P P   . If the prices are stationary, market integration and the Law of One Price 
(LOP) can be examined by estimating the regression,  t jt it P b a P     ln ln . The 
absolute LOP, saying that the prices of a commodity in two different markets are equal 
and their co-movement is perfect and price changes in the exporting market are 
transmitted to the importing market on a one-for-one basis, holds when  0  a  and 
1  b . The relative LOP, saying that the prices have a proportional relationship and their 
levels differ due to factors like transportation and other transfer costs, holds when 
0  a  and 1  b . 
However, when the prices are non-stationary, co-integration is considered to be an 
appropriate method for testing market integration and the LOP. This method can be used 
even in a situation when the co-movement of prices is less than perfect, prices are 
simultaneously determined and there are seasonal variations in transfer costs. Since MADHUSUDAN GHOSH  20
co-integration implies that there exists a linear long-run relationship between 
non-stationary variables in question, the co-integration test for market integration 
evaluates whether there is a statistically significant linear long-run relationship between 
different price series. If this relationship exists, then the markets are said to be integrated 
in general. We have applied the ML method of co-integration to test for market 
integration. Unlike the Engle-Granger (1987) method of co-integration, the ML method 
of co-integration allows for testing multiple co-integrating vectors in a multivariate 
framework. Since this test is carried out in a reduced form vector autoregressive (VAR) 
model, it does not involve the endogeneity problem caused by simultaneity in price 
determination, so the test results remain invariant to the choice of a variable for 
normalisation in the regression. 
Under certain condition, the ML method of co-integration, besides providing tests 
for the general notion of market integration, allows testing for the relative LOP in a 
bivariate as well as in a multivariate setting. Since this version of the LOP holds for a 
group of commodity prices when each pair of the prices move proportionally to each 
other, the multivariate test for it requires that there is only one common stochastic trend 
in the system, obtained when the prices are pair-wise co-integrated. With  n prices in 
the system, pair wise co-integration requires that there must be  1  n  co-integrating 
vectors and hence only one common stochastic trend. In general, with  n price series 
and  r  co-integrating vectors, there will be  r n   different stochastic trends (Stock 
and Watson, 1988). It may be mentioned that  n  number of prices can be organised into 
2 / ) 1 (  n n   pairs. However, since with n   prices one can find at most  1  n 
co-integrating vectors, all but  1  n  pairs are redundant. Hence, the relative LOP as 
implied by pair wise co-integration (i.e., when all the price series share a common 
stochastic trend) is a stronger proposition than the general notion of market integration 
as implied by the presence of at least one co-integrating vector (and multiple stochastic 
trends) in a multivariate system. While the relative LOP necessarily implies that markets 
are integrated, integration of markets does not necessarily satisfy the LOP. This signifies 
that the number of co-integrating vector is an important indicator of the extent of 
co-movement of prices. An increase in the number of co-integrating vector implies an 
increase in the strength of market integration.   
Hence, for assessing the impact of agricultural policy reforms on food market 
integration using the co-integration method, we need to examine the extent of market 
integration during the post-reform period vis-à-vis the pre-reform one. It is expected that 
agricultural policy reforms – liberalizing food grain markets, limiting government 
interventions and allowing the private sector to contribute its best in the markets – would 
lead to an increase in the extent of market integration. It may, however, be noted that 
infrastructure development policies for the communication network may help strengthen 
spatial market integration by reducing transaction costs. Although it is difficult to 
separate out the individual effects of agricultural and infrastructural policies on market 
integration, there can be no doubt that agricultural policy reforms in the presence of 
good communication network would strengthen market integration. From an AGRICULTURAL POLICY REFORMS AND SPATIAL INTEGRATION  21
econometric point of view, this would mean that the number of statistically significant 
co-integrating vector should be larger in the post-reform period than in the pre-reform 
one. 
 
3.1.  Co-integration  Method 
 
The ML method of co-integration, due to Johansen (1988) and Johansen and Juselius 
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The procedure for testing co-integration is based on the error correction model 
(ECM) representation of  t P  given  by 
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where  t P  is an  ) 1 (  n   vector of I(1) (i.e., integrated of order one) prices; 
); ....... ( 1 i i I           1 ,..., 2 , 1   k i ; ); ....... ( 1 k I         each of  i   is 
an ) ( n n  matrix of parameters;  t   is an identically and independently distributed 
n-dimensional vector of residuals with zero mean and variance matrix,    ;    is a 
constant term and t is trend. Since  k t P  is I(1), but  t P    and  i t P    variables are I(0) 
(i.e., integrated of order zero), Equation (2) will be balanced if  k t P    is I(0). So, it is 
the    matrix that conveys information about the long-run relationship among the 
variables in  t P.   The rank of   ,  r , determines the number of co-integrating vectors, 
as it determines how many linear combinations of  t P  are stationary. If  n r  , the 
variables are stationary in levels. If  0  r , no linear combination of  t P   is stationary. If 
n r rank     ) ( 0 , and there are  r n  matrices   and    such that       , 
then it can be said that there are  r   co-integrating relations among the elements of  t P . 
The co-integrating vector    has the property that  t P   is stationary even though  t P  
itself is non-stationary. The matrix   measures the strength of the co-integrating 
vectors in the ECM, as it represents the speed of adjustment parameters.   
Two likelihood ratio test-statistics are used. The null hypothesis of at most r  
co-integrating vector against a general alternative hypothesis of more than r  
co-integrating vectors is tested by   MADHUSUDAN GHOSH  22
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The null of  r   co-integrating vector against the alternative of  1  r   is tested by 
 
Maximum eigen value statistic (-max) ) ˆ 1 ln( 1     r T  . 
 
i  ˆ s are the estimated eigen values (characteristic roots) obtained from the   
matrix; T is the number of usable observations.   
 
 
4.    DATA AND EMPIRICAL RESULTS 
 
4.1.  Database 
 
The data set used in this study consists of monthly wholesale prices of rice and 
wheat for the period from March 1984 to March 2006. In order to compare the extent of 
food market integration between the pre- and post-reform periods, we have divided the 
entire period into two sub-periods. Although the reform process directly related to 
agriculture were initiated since the mid-1990s, the large-scale economic reforms 
involving structural adjustment and liberalisation programmes, especially those related 
to internal and external trade, initiated since July/August 1991, have important 
implications for agriculture in general and agricultural commodity markets in particular. 
For this reason, we have considered March 1984 to July 1991 (1984:3 – 1991:7) as the 
pre-reform period, and August 1991 to March 2006 (1991:8 – 2006:3) as the post-reform 
one. Since the agricultural policy reforms in the early-1990s were mostly related to 
internal and external trade in agricultural commodities, their effects would be largely felt 
in the commodity markets and prices. This is why the policy reforms in the early-1990s 
are more important relative to those in the mid-1990s from the point of view of market 
integration. However, since the reform process has been continuous, the effects of 
agricultural policies during the post-reform period would be reflected in the extent of 
spatial market integration.   
The data on rice and wheat prices quoted at different market centres of the selected 
states were compiled from various issues of Agricultural Situation in India, a monthly 
journal published by the Directorate of Economics and Statistics, Ministry of 
Agriculture, Government of India. The choice of the states and the market centres from 
each state was constrained by the availability of consistent data for the period. The 
selected states are the major rice/wheat producing states. For rice, we have selected four 
states: Bihar, Orissa, Uttar Pradesh (UP) and West Bengal (WB). The market centres 
chosen are: Dumka, Gaya, Jamshedpur, Patna and Ranchi from Bihar; Balasore, Cuttack, 
Jeypore and Sambalpur from Orissa; Allahabad, Azamgarh, Bahraich, Gorakhpur and AGRICULTURAL POLICY REFORMS AND SPATIAL INTEGRATION  23
Nowgarh from UP; Contai, Sainthia and Siliguri from WB. For wheat, four states viz., 
Haryana, Punjab, Rajasthan and UP are selected, and the market centres chosen from 
each state are: Ambala, Karnal, Rohtak and Sonepat from Haryana; Amritsar, Barnala, 
Jalandhar and Ludhiana from Punjab; Alwar, Bharatpur, Jaipur, Jodhpur, Kota and 
Sriganganagar from Rajasthan; Bahraich, Gorakhpur, Jhansi and Kalpi from UP. 
For rice market, the price series of the coarse variety of rice quoted in Dumka, Gaya, 
Jamshedpur, Patna, and Ranchi are used for Bihar. The price series of the coarse variety 
reported in Balasore, Cuttack, Jeypore and Sambalpur are used for Orissa. For UP, the 
price series of the III/IV-ARWA  variety quoted in Allahabad, Azamgarh, Bahraich, 
Gorakhpur and Nowgarh are used. Finally, for WB, the price series of the common 
variety quoted in Contai, Sainthia and Siliguri are used. Similarly, for wheat market, the 
price series of the Mexican variety reported in Ambala, Karnal, Rohtak and Sonepat are 
used for Haryana. For Punjab, the price series of the WL-711/Kalyan variety quoted in 
Amritsar, Barnala, Jalandhar and Ludhiana are used. For Rajasthan, we have used the 
price series of the Mexican  variety collected from six market centres viz., Alwar, 
Bharatpur, Jaipur, Jodhpur, Kota and Sriganganagar. Finally, for UP, the price series of 
the Mexican/FAQ variety quoted in Bahraich, Gorakhpur, Jhansi and Kalpi are used. By 
choosing the comparable varieties of rice and wheat across market centres and states, we 
assume that price variability is due to spatial and seasonal effects and not so much due to 
variety differences. 
 
4.2.  Trends  in  Prices 
 
Figures 1a to 1d in the Appendix present the monthly wholesale prices of rice quoted 
at different market places in Bihar, Orissa, UP and WB for the entire period covering 
both the pre- and post-reform ones. Similarly, Figures 2a to 2d in the Appendix display 
the monthly wholesale prices of wheat quoted at different market places in Haryana, 
Punjab, Rajasthan and UP. The prices appear to display trending behaviour with upward 
drifts and seasonal fluctuations. However, from a visual inspection of the time path of 
the prices, it is difficult to say whether the prices are characterised by deterministic or 
stochastic trends. It is also difficult to indicate the nature of relationships among the 
prices. We need to conduct unit root test to check the univariate time-series properties of 
the prices, and to employ appropriate co-integration test to ascertain the nature of 
co-movement of the prices during different periods. 
 
4.3.    Order of Integration of Prices 
 
As a prerequisite to conducting the co-integration tests, we have evaluated the 
univariate time-series properties of the data to see whether all the prices are 
non-stationary and integrated of the same order. We have applied the augmented 
Dickey-Fuller (ADF) test (Dickey and Fuller, 1979, 1981) to all the price series of rice 
and wheat for the pre- and post-reform periods. The ADF test statistics for the rice and MADHUSUDAN GHOSH  24
wheat prices in levels and first-difference are reported in Tables 1 and 2, respectively. 
All the price series are transformed in natural logarithm. The lag length is selected, using 
the Akaike Information Criterion (AIC). The results show that the null hypothesis of 
non-stationarity cannot be rejected for the prices in levels but it can be rejected for all 
the prices in first-differences for the pre- and post-reform periods. The prices are, 
therefore, non-stationary in levels but stationary in first-differences. This implies that all 
the series of rice and wheat prices contain a single unit root and are integrated of order 
one, I(1) for both the periods. 
 
 
Table 1.    ADF Test for Unit Root in the Prices of Rice 
Market centre  Pre-reforms 
(1984:3 – 1991:7) 
Post-reforms 
(1991:8 – 2006:3) 
Level (ττ) First-difference  (τμ) Level (ττ) First-difference (τμ) 
Bihar: Coarse variety 
Dumka  −3.041 (9)  −4.905 (6)*  −1.226 (2) −6.948 (2)* 
Gaya  −3.061 (2)  −4.561 (9)*  −3.042 (4) −5.641 (8)* 
Jamshedpur  −3.047 (2)  −7.465 (2)*  −2.152 (2) −7.188 (2)* 
Patna  −3.059 (2)  −5.481 (3)*  −2.596 (3) −8.096 (2)* 
Ranchi  −3.074 (5)  −3.738 (8)*  −0.698 (9) −4.628 (9)* 
Orissa: Coarse variety 
Balasore  −3.177 (5)  −4.931 (7)*  −1.737 (4) −6.144 (4)* 
Cuttack  −1.999 (7)  −3.002 (5)**  −0.906 (2) −7.278 (3)* 
Jeypore  −3.163 (7)  −6.998 (8)*  −2.210 (3) −8.456 (2)* 
Sambalpur  −3.146 (3)  −6.013 (4)*  −0.885 (8) −3.776 (7)* 
Uttar Pradesh: III/IV ARWA variety 
Allahabad  −2.073 (2)  −4.971 (3)*  −3.124 (4) −5.329 (8)* 
Azamgarh  −3.132 (3)  −5.432 (2)*  −3.146 (3) −5.998 (6)* 
Bahraich  −3.103 (3)  −4.474 (8)*  −3.127 (2) −5.064 (9)* 
Gorakhpur  −2.332 (8)  −4.557 (9)*  −2.657 (2) −7.636 (2)* 
Nowgarh  −2.481 (5)  −4.194 (8)*  −2.407 (3) −5.816 (7)* 
West Bengal: Common variety 
Contai  −3.086 (4)  −4.742 (9)*  −2.658 (2) −6.596 (2)* 
Sainthia  −3.067 (3)  −6.108 (8)*  −2.601 (2) −7.727 (2)* 
Siliguri  −2.231 (3)  −5.837 (8)*  −1.231 (3) −6.121 (4)* 
Notes: * and ** denote significance at 1% and 5% levels, respectively. Figures in parentheses are the 
optimal numbers of augmenting lags selected by the Akaike Information Criterion (AIC). The level of 
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Table 2.    ADF Test for Unit Root in the Prices of Wheat 
Market centre  Pre-reforms 
(1984:3 – 1991:7) 
Post-reforms 
(1991:8 – 2006:3) 
Level (ττ) First-difference  (τμ) Level (ττ) First-difference (τμ) 
Haryana: Mexican variety 
Ambala  −3.121 (2)  −5.961 (2)*  −3.021 (2) −6.091 (4)* 
Karnal  −2.271 (3)  −3.867 (9)*  −2.485 (2) −7.957 (2)* 
Rohtak  −2.193 (3)  −4.565 (8)*  −1.665 (9) −5.341 (8)* 
Sonepat  −2.153 (3)  −3.729 (7)*  −2.811 (2) −4.815 (9)* 
Punjab: WL-711/Kalyan variety 
Amritsar  −2.219 (3)  −5.706 (4)*  −2.387 (2) −4.829 (7)* 
Barnala  −2.256 (7)  −4.432 (8)*  −2.279 (2) −6.089 (5)* 
Jalandhar  −3.076 (3)  −3.987 (6)*  −0.859 (8) −5.495 (7)* 
Ludhiana  −2.548 (4)  −4.401 (8)*  −1.222 (6) −6.016 (9)* 
Rajasthan: Mexican variety 
Alwar  −3.022 (2)  −6.240 (2)*  −2.864 (2) −7.634 (2)* 
Bharatpur  −2.949 (2)  −5.518 (2)*  −3.012 (2) −6.144 (4)* 
Jaipur  −2.933 (2)  −5.210 (2)*  −2.167 (2) −5.762 (8)* 
Jodhpur  −3.151 (6)  −3.779 (5)*  −2.351 (5) −7.170 (4)* 
Kota  −3.031 (2)  −4.297 (4)*  −3.131 (3) −6.054 (4)* 
Sriganganagar  −3.117 (2)  −5.962 (2)*  −2.473 (2) −7.413 (2)* 
Uttar Pradesh: Mexican/FAQ variety 
Bahraich  −2.489 (2)  −4.929 (5)*  −3.044 (2) −7.514 (3)* 
Gorakhpur  −2.668 (2)  −5.997 (3)*  −2.489 4) −5.527 (9)* 
Jhansi  −2.866 (3)  −6.111 (3)*  −3.127 (3) −7.322 (3)* 
Kalpi  −3.091 (2)  −5.641 (3)*  −2.495 (3) −5.386 (8)* 
Notes: * denotes significance at 1% level. Figures in parentheses are the optimal numbers of augmenting 
lags selected by the Akaike Information Criterion (AIC). The level of significance of the test statistics is 
determined, using the critical values tabulated by Fuller (1976, Table 8.5.2, p.373). 
 
 
4.4.  Spatial  Integration  of  Markets 
 
We have investigated the impact of agricultural policy reforms on intra-state as well 
as inter-state spatial integration of rice and wheat markets.   
 
4.4.1.  Intra-State  Integration 
 
We have evaluated intra-state spatial integration of these markets by investigating 
the long-run relationship between the prices of state-specific varieties of rice and wheat 
quoted at spatially separated locations in each state. The co-integration test results for 
intra-state spatial integration of rice markets are presented in Table 3. Both the -trace MADHUSUDAN GHOSH  26
and  -max tests show no significant co-integrating vector and hence no spatial 
integration of the five regional rice markets in Bihar during the pre-reform period. 
However, during the post-reform period, both the tests reveal three significant 
co-integrating vectors, indicating that the regional rice markets are strongly integrated. 
For Orissa, the -trace test shows at most two co-integrating vectors, and the -max test 
shows at most one co-integrating vector for the coarse variety of rice during the 
pre-reform period. The extent of spatial market integration increased significantly during 
the post-reform period, as both the tests show three co-integrating vectors and hence one 
common stochastic trend. The number of common stochastic trends is determined by 
subtracting the number of co-integrating vectors from the dimension of the impact 
matrix given by the number of variables (n) included in the VAR. The finding of n-1 
co-integrating vectors implies that all the prices share a common stochastic trend and so 
are pair-wise co-integrated, suggesting that the relative LOP holds for the coarse variety 
of rice in Orissa during the post-reform period. The results for UP and WB show at most 
one significant co-integrating vector during the pre-reform period, indicating that the 
regional rice markets in these states were integrated to an extent. However, the extent of 
market integration in these states increased greatly during the post-reform period. Both 
the  -trace and -max tests reveal three significant co-integrating vectors and two 
common stochastic trends for UP. The results for WB indicate two co-integrating vectors 
and one common stochastic trend, suggesting that the prices of common variety of rice 
quoted in three market centres are co-integrated pair wise. This implies that the regional 
rice markets in WB were so integrated during the post-reform period as to satisfy the 
relative LOP. 
The co-integration results for intra-state spatial integration of wheat markets are 
reported in Table 4. The results for Haryana, Punjab and Rajasthan show no significant 
co-integrating vector for the Mexican/WL-711/Kalyan variety of wheat marketed in these 
states in the pre-reform period. The results for UP show one co-integrating vector by the 
-max test and two co-integrating vectors by the -trace test for the Mexican/FAQ 
variety of wheat during the pre-reform period. Thus, while the regional wheat markets in 
UP were spatially integrated to an extent, the regional markets in Haryana, Punjab and 
Rajasthan were segmented during the pre-reform period. On the other hand, the results 
for the post-reform period reveal that the extent of spatial integration of wheat markets 
has increased remarkably in all the four states. The number of co-integrating vector has 
increased to such an extent that the wheat prices quoted at regional markets in each state 
contain a common stochastic trend and therefore are co-integrated pair wise. Thus, the 
regional wheat markets, which were either segmented or poorly integrated during the 
pre-reform period, are found to be so integrated as to satisfy the relative LOP in all the 
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Table 3.  Co-integration  Results  for Intra-State Spatial Integration of Rice Markets 
Pre-reforms  
(1984:3 – 1991:7) 
Post-reforms  









Trace test  Maximum 
eigen value test 
Null  λ-trace Null λ-max Null λ-trace Null λ-max 
Bihar (k=2 for the pre- and post-reform periods) 
0.255  r=0 70.36  r=0 25.60  0.234 r=0 102.20*  r=0 37.61** 
0.246  r1 44.76  r=1 24.60  0.183 r1 64.59*  r=1 28.48** 
0.134  r2 20.16  r=2 12.51  0.156 r2 36.11** r=2 23.90** 
0.081  r3 7.65 r=3 7.34 0.058 r3 12.21  r=3 8.43 
0.030  r4 0.31 r=4 0.31 0.026 r43 . 7 8   r=4 3.78 
Orissa (k=2 for the pre- and post-reform periods) 
0.297  r=0 62.77*  r=0 30.73** 0.262 r=0 87.55*  r=0 40.37* 
0.212  r1 32.05***  r=1 20.68  0.208 r1 47.18*  r=1 31.06* 
0.121  r2 11.37  r=2 11.20  0.113 r2 16.12*** r=2 15.93*** 
0.002  r3 0.17 r=3 0.17 0.001 r30 . 1 9   r=3 0.19 
Uttar Pradesh (k=2 for the pre- and post-reform periods) 
0.344  r=0 84.81**  r=0 36.73** 0.272 r=0 108.38** r=0 44.71* 
0.227  r1 48.08  r=1 22.42  0.190 r1 63.67*  r=1 29.72* 
0.148  r2 25.66  r=2 13.94  0.149 r2 33.95*  r=2 22.66* 
0.123  r3 11.72  r=3 11.40  0.054 r3 11.29  r=3 7.77 
0.004  r4 0.32 r=4 0.32 0.025 r43 . 5 2   r=4 3.52 
West Bengal (k=2 for the pre- and post-reform periods) 
0.327  r=0 45.67*  r=0 34.48* 0.183 r=0 46.36*  r=0 28.53** 
0.118  r1 11.19  r=1 10.96  0.104 r1 17.83*** r=1 15.45*** 
0.003  r2 0.23  r=2 0.23 0.017 r22 . 3 8   r=2 2.38 
Notes: *, ** and *** indicate significance at 99%, 95% and 90% levels, respectively. The level of 
significance is determined, using the critical values from Osterwald-Lenum (1992). k=Optimal lag selected 
by the AIC. The estimated VAR includes a constant and a trend.   
 
 
The extent of market integration depends on the level of transaction costs determined 
primarily by transport and communication infrastructure and contract enforcement 
mechanisms, the degree of perfection of knowledge regarding market conditions and 
storage facilities. Differences in the extent of market integration across states could be 
due to regional disparities in infrastructure and institutional structure of markets. Spatial 
inefficiency of the regional wheat markets in Haryana, Punjab and Rajasthan vis-à-vis 
UP in the pre-reform period could be due to inadequate transport networks, shortage of 
storage facilities, lack of competition in the markets, credit constraints limiting private 
traders’ investment in working and long-term capital, and government interventions in 
various forms. The situation might have changed due to, among other things, agricultural MADHUSUDAN GHOSH  28
policy reforms, which appear to have improved the spatial integration of wheat markets 
in all the states during the post-reform period. 
 
 
Table 4.  Co-integration  Results  for Intra-State Spatial Integration of Wheat Markets 
Pre-reforms  
(1984:3 – 1991:7) 
Post-reforms  









Trace test  Maximum 
eigen value test 
Null  λ-trace Null λ-max Null λ-trace Null λ-max 
Haryana (k=1 for the pre- reform period and k=2 for post-reform period) 
0.136  r=0 18.19  r=0 12.29  0.319  r=0 130.29* r=0 54.23* 
0.045  r1 5.89 r=1 3.91 0.261 r1 76.06* r=1 42.62* 
0.023  r2 1.99 r=2 1.99 0.201 r2 33.44* r=2 31.66* 
Neg.  r3 Neg.  r=3 Neg. 0.013 r31 . 7 8   r=3 1.78 
Punjab (k=4 for the pre-reform period and k=2 for the post-reform period) 
0.445  r=0 32.68  r=0 20.02  0.288  r=0 116.32* r=0 47.96* 
0.206  r1 12.67  r=1 7.86 0.248 r1 68.36* r=1 40.18* 
0.098  r2 4.81 r=2 3.52 0.164 r2 28.18* r=2 25.34* 
0.037  r3 1.29 r=3 1.29 0.020 r32 . 8 4   r=3 2.84 
Rajasthan (k=5 for the pre-reform period and k=2 for the post-reform period) 
0.856  r=0 58.21  r=0 23.30  0.669  r=0 283.29* r=0 156.10* 
0.726  r1 34.91  r=1 15.55  0.253  r11 2 7 . 1 9 * r=1 41.07** 
0.544  r2 19.36  r=2 9.41 0.225 r2 86.12* r=2 36.00* 
0.419  r3 9.95 r=3 6.52 0.183 r3 50.12* r=3 28.53** 
0.175  r4 3.43 r=4 2.32 0.128 r4 21.59** r=4 19.38** 
0.088  r5 1.11 r=5 1.11 0.015 r52 . 2 1   r=5 2.21 
Uttar Pradesh (k=2 for the pre- reform period and k=1 for the post-reform period) 
0.432  r=0 85.03* r=0 49.27* 0.386  r=0 163.04* r=0 69.28* 
0.209  r1 35.76**  r=1 20.39  0.327  r1 93.76* r=1 56.34* 
0.133  r2 15.37  r=2 12.45  0.231  r2 37.42* r=2 37.36* 
0.033  r3 2.92 r=3 2.92 0.0002 r30 . 0 4   r=3 0.04 
Notes: * and ** indicate significance at 99%, and 95% levels, respectively. The level of significance is 
determined, using the critical values from Osterwald-Lenum (1992). k=Optimal lag selected by the AIC. 
The estimated VAR includes a constant and a trend. Neg.=Negligible. 
 
 
4.4.2.  Inter-State  Integration 
 
Inter-state spatial integration of rice markets during the pre- and post-reform periods 
has been investigated by estimating the long-run linear relationship between the prices 
of the state-specific variety of rice quoted in four markets represented by Allahabad (UP), AGRICULTURAL POLICY REFORMS AND SPATIAL INTEGRATION  29
Balasore (Orissa), Patna (Bihar) and Siliguri (WB). Since the same exercise performed 
on different combinations of representative markets from each state offered similar 
results, we have reported the results for inter-state spatial integration among one such 
combination of the above four rice markets (Table 5). The results reveal only one 
co-integrating vector and hence three common stochastic trends, suggesting that the 
Indian rice market system represented by the four markets across states was integrated to 
an extent during the pre-reform period. The extent of inter-state spatial integration of the 
rice markets has improved, as the number of co-integrating vector has increased during 
the post-reform period. 
 
 
Table 5.    Co-integration Results for Inter-State Spatial Integration of Rice Markets 
Pre-reforms  
(1984:3 – 1991:7) 
Post-reforms  









Trace test  Maximum eigen 
value test 
Null  λ-trace Null λ-max Null λ-trace Null  λ-max 
0.292  r=0 57.67**  r=0 30.03*** 0.255 r=0 78.22* r=0 41.53* 
0.189  r1 27.64  r=1 18.31 0.142 r1 36.69* r=1 21.62*** 
0.101  r2 9.33  r=2 9.30 0.079 r2 15.07 r=2  11.74 
0.0003  r3 0.03  r=3 0.03 0.023 r3 3.33 r=3  3.33 
Notes: *, ** and *** indicate significance at 99%, 95% and 90% levels, respectively. The level of 
significance is determined using the critical values from Osterwald-Lenum (1992). k= Optimal lag selected 
by the AIC. k=2 for the pre- and post-reform periods. The estimated VAR includes a constant and a trend. 
The market centres considered are: Allahabad (UP), Balasore (Orissa), Patna (Bihar) and Siliguri (WB). 




In order to examine whether the extent of spatial integration of wheat markets across 
states has improved during the post-reform period relative to the pre-reform one, we 
have estimated the long-run linear relationship between the prices of the state-specific 
variety of wheat quoted in four representative markets viz., Ambala (Haryana), Ludhiana 
(Punjab), Jaipur (Rajasthan) and Gorakhpur (UP). The same exercise carried out on 
different combinations of representative markets from each state provided similar results. 
Table 6 reports the results for inter-state spatial integration among one such combination 
of four wheat markets mentioned above. While the -max test shows one co-integrating 
vector, the -trace test reveals no co-integrating vector at all during the pre-reform 
period. However, during the post-reform period, both the tests show three co-integrating 
vectors and hence one common stochastic trend, suggesting that the prices of wheat in 
the regional markets across states are strongly integrated. The presence of a common 
stochastic trend implies that the prices are pair wise co-integrated and the regional wheat MADHUSUDAN GHOSH  30
markets across states are integrated to such an extent as to validate the relative LOP 
during the post-reform period. 
 
 
Table 6.    Co-integration Results for Inter-State Spatial Integration of Wheat Markets 
Pre-reforms  
(1984:3 – 1991:7) 
Post-reforms  









Trace test  Maximum 
eigen value 
test 
Null  λ-trace Null  λ-max Null λ-trace Null  λ-max 
0.281  r=0 46.65 r=0 27.78*** 0.352 r=0 120.91* r=0 57.72* 
0.150  r1 18.87 r=1 13.65 0.227 r1 63.18* r=1 34.35* 
0.060  r2 5.22  r=2 5.22  0.138 r2 28.84* r=2 23.61* 
Neg.  r3 Neg.  r=3 Neg.  0.061 r35 . 2 3   r=3 5.23 
Notes: * and *** indicate significance at 99% and 90% levels, respectively. The level of significance is 
determined using the critical values from Osterwald-Lenum (1992). k=Optimal lag selected by the AIC. 
k=1 for the pre-reform period, and k=2 for the post-reform period. The estimated VAR includes a constant 
and a trend. The market centres considered are: Ambala (Haryana), Ludhiana (Punjab), Gorakhpur (UP) 
and Jaipur (Rajasthan). The same exercise performed on different combinations of representative markets 
from each state offered similar results. Neg.=Negligible. 
 
 
Overall, the results for intra-state and inter-state spatial integration of rice and wheat 
markets indicate that the extent of integration improved remarkably during the 
post-reform period relative to the pre-reform one. The regional markets, which were 
either segmented or poorly integrated during the pre-reform period, are found to be 
strongly integrated, and in most cases to such an extent that satisfies the relative LOP 
during the post-reform period. While the relative LOP holds for rice markets in two 
states, it holds for wheat markets in four states. It also holds for wheat markets across 
states. The agricultural policy reforms since the early-1990s appear to have contributed 
towards improving the extent of spatial integration of food grain markets.   
 
 
5.  SUMMARY  AND  POLICY  CONCLUSIONS 
 
Applying the maximum likelihood method of co-integration, we have investigated 
the impact of agricultural policy reforms on spatial integration of rice and wheat markets 
in India. The results indicate that the extent of intra- and inter-state spatial integration of 
these markets has improved during the post-reform period relative to the pre-reform one. 
The regional markets, which were either segmented or poorly integrated during the 
pre-reform period, are found to be strongly integrated, and in most cases to such an AGRICULTURAL POLICY REFORMS AND SPATIAL INTEGRATION  31
extent that satisfies the relative LOP during the post-reform period. The agricultural 
policy reforms since the early-1990s seem to have contributed towards improving the 
extent of spatial integration of food grain markets, lending support to the argument for 
market liberalisation and minimisation of government interventions in the food grain 
economy. Further liberalisation would strengthen spatial integration of markets. 
Since the effects and incentives of different policies will be transmitted smoothly to 
all regional markets in an well integrated market system, the government could promote 
growth in production and ensure price stability with lower costs of operation by suitably 
designing price policy and rationalising its activities in the food grain economy and 
allowing private traders to contribute as much as possible in the market. As the correct 
price signals are transmitted smoothly to all the markets, producers will be able to take 
appropriate decisions on input purchase, production, sale, storage, etc. Consumers will 
also be benefited, as the well-integrated market ensures availability of food grains and 
stability in prices at the regional level. The Bangladesh famine in 1974 has often been 
explained in terms of highly volatile food prices causing dramatic declines in food 
entitlements for households dependent on markets for their food supply (Quddus and 
Becker, 2000). Our results suggest that in well-integrated food markets, this type of 
famine could be avoided by suitably designing agricultural price policy and rationalising 
government activities (such as buffer stock and public distribution of food grains) in the 
food economy. 
The degree of market integration depends not only on agricultural policy reforms but 
also on the level of transaction costs determined primarily by transport and 
communication infrastructures, storage facilities, and contract enforcement mechanisms. 
The government could promote agricultural growth and ensure stability in food grain 
prices by limiting its direct intervention in the agricultural markets, but increasing its 
attention to improve physical and institutional infrastructures. Reliance on direct 
intervention of the government in the markets can be reduced significantly, if the 
government promotes efficient trading of agricultural commodities by liberalising the 
markets, improves the transport and communication networks, and provides storage 
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APPENDIX 
 
Figure 1a.    Behaviour of Rice Prices (Rupees per Quintal) in Bihar 
 
 
Figure 1b.    Behaviour of Rice Prices (Rupees per Quintal) in Orissa 
 
 
Figure 1c.    Behaviour of Rice Prices (Rupees per Quintal) in Uttar Pradesh 
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Figure 1d.    Behaviour of Rice Prices (Rupees per Quintal) in West Bengal 
 
 
Figure 2a.    Behaviour of Wheat Prices (Rupees per Quintal) in Haryana 
 
 
Figure 2b.    Behaviour of Wheat Prices (Rupees per Quintal) in Punjab 
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Figure 2c.    Behaviour of Wheat Prices (Rupees per Quintal) in Rajasthan 
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